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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-THE DEMISE OF STANDING TO As
SERT FOURTH AMENDMENT
vucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
I.

VIOLATIONS-United States v. Sal

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Salvucci l two defendants, John Salvucci
and Joseph Zackular, were charged with twelve counts of unlawful
possession of stolen mail. Incriminating evidence, consisting of wel
fare checks and a checkwriting machine, was seized during a search
of an apartment rented by Zackular's wife. 2 The search was con'"
ducted pursuant to a warrant. Defendants filed a motion to sup
press the evidence on the ground that the search warrant had been
issued without probable cause. 3 Following the suppression hearing,
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
held that the affidavit supporting the warrant was defective. 4 The
search was found to be unlawful and defendants' motion to sup
press was granted. 5
The prosecution appealed the lower court's suppression order,
challenging defendants' standing to assert a fourth amendment vio
lation. 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that defendants had "automatic ,standing" to challenge the
constitutionality of the search by virtue of their being charged with
a possessory offense. 7 The appellate court affirmed the district
court's holding. 8
Traditionally, a defendant was required to show some proprie
1.

United States v. Salvucci, 559 F.2d 1094 (1st Cir. 1979), rev'd & remanded,

448 U.S. 83 (1980).
2.

The Supreme Court stated that Zackular's mother's apartment was searched.

448 U.S. at 85.
3.
4.

599 F.2d at 1094-95.
Id.
5. Id. at 1094.
6. Id. at 1095.
7. Id. at 1097.
8. The fatal defect in the present affidavit is that it does not disclose the
date of the conversation overheard by the informant in which Zackular
stated that the checkwriter used to print forged checks was being kept in his
wife's apartment in Melrose. Without this date, there was no way for the
magistrate to determine whether the information was sufficiently timely to
support the warrant.
Id. at 1096.
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tary or possessory interest either in the premises searched or the
items seized before actual standing to assert a fourth amendment
claim would be conferred. 9 After a demonstration of the requisite
interest, the court would determine whether the search and sei
zure were unlawful. If a constitutional violation had occurred, its
fruits would be barred by the exclusionary rule from admission into
evidence. 10
jones v. United States,ll decided in 1960, created an excep
tion to the traditional standing rule. The First Circuit, following
jones, held that individuals charged with crimes of possession
could challenge the admissibility of seized evidence without prov
ing that their personal fourth amendment rights were violated. 12
Prior to jones, the exclusionary rule was available only when a de
fendant showed the requisite possessory interest in the confiscated
items. 13 When the crime was one of possession, such a showing
amounted to a confession of guilt. 14 Thus, defendants were forced
to weigh their fourth amendment rights 15 against those granted by
the fifth amendment. 1s jones eliminated the proof requirement in
such a situation: individuals charged with possessory offenses "auto
matically" could challenge the constitutionality of a search and sei
zure.17
The First Circuit, though it granted automatic standing to de
fendants, questioned the vitality of the doctrine in light of a 1968
Supreme Court decision; Simrrwns v. United States .18 Simrrwns
held that testimony proffered in support of a motion to suppress
could not be used against a defendant at trial on the issue of
9. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Steeber v"United States,
198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952); Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932) .
.10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) (1972) states: "If the motion [to suppress] is granted
the property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hear
ing or trial."
11. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
12.599 F.2d at 1097.
13. Id.
14. 362 U.S. at 261-62.
15. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. ..." U.S. CONST. amend. v.
17. 362 U.S. at 263-64.
18. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
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guilt.19 Since Simrrwns barred the introduction of pretrial testi
mony at the trial on the merits, the self-incrimination dilemma that
prompted the Supreme Court to devise automatic standing was no
longer a threat. The Supreme Court granted c-ertiorari to United
States v. Salvucci 20 to determine conclusively the effect that
Simrrwns had on automatic standing.
The Court ruled that defendants charged with crimes of pos
session no longer could invoke automatic standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a search and seizure. Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, stated without equivocation that the need for au
tomatic standing no longer exists. 21 Following Simrrwns, individuals
were freed from the need to weigh their fourth amendment protec
tions against those granted by the fifth amendment. Any testimony
or evidence proffered to assert actual standing cannot be admitted
at trial. 22
Justice Marshall, in his dissent to Salvucci, pointed out that,
although such evidence cannot be admitted at trial, it can be used
for impeachment purposes. 23 Further, other language in the major
ity opinion has ramifications far beyond a fourth versus fifth
amendment dilemma. No longer does a claim to possession of the
seized good suffice to confer actual standing. The Court focused on
"not merely whether the defendant had a possessory interest in the
items seized, but whether he had an expectation of privacy in the
area searched. "24 The Court has narrowed the class of persons pro
tected by the fourth amendment to those with the requisite inter
est in the premises searched, not in the items seized. Objections to
unreasonable searches and seizures may be raised only by those
with a legitimate "expectation of privacy" in the premises. 25
This "legitimate expectation of privacy" standard was devised
in another Supreme Court decision, Rakas v. Illinois. 26 In that
case, the police searched a motor vehicle in which defendants were
passengers and confiscated a rifle and some shells. 27 Defendants

19. [d. at 394.
20. 444 U.S. 989 (1979).
21. United States v. Salvucci, 488 U.S. 83, 95 (1980).
22. Id. at 89-90. See also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 394.
23. 448 U.S. at 96.
24. [d. at 93 (emphasis added).
25. [d.
26. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
27. [d. at 130. Defendants, charged with armed robbery, were indeed the tar
gets of the police search. [d. at 169 (White, J. dissenting).
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contended that they had standing to object to the search and sei
zure. The majority held that individuals have standing only when
they have "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place. "28 As mere guests in the automobile, defendants did not
have a sufficient interest. 29 In Rakas, Justice Rehnquist noted that
defendants failed to claim a possessory or proprietary interest in
the seized items. 3o In Salvucci, he rejected that prong of the
standing test: actual standing can be secured only through an ex
pectation of privacy in the area searched. 31
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, questioned whether
anything short of ownership of the searched vehicle would satisfy
the Rakas test. 32 Construing a privacy interest in the premises to
mean ownership narrows the class of individuals protected by the
fourth amendment only to those who hold property. The Salvucci
decision not only extinguished automatic standing but also heralded
the demise of actual standing for a number of individuals subjected
to unreasonable searches and seizures.
Salvucci's ramifications will become clear when standing is
placed in a historical perspective. The history of standing thus is
presented in part II of this note. An analysis of the exclusionary
rule and its purpose under the fourth amendment is presented in
part III. In part IV, this note concludes by demonstrating how the
Supreme Court's narrow definition of fourth amendment standing
has deprived a number of individuals of the exclusionary rule's pro
tections.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The ExclUSionary Rule and the Concept of Standing
In the 1914 case of Weeks v. United States,33 the Supreme
Court established the exclusionary rule for federal criminal pro
ceedings. 34 Evidence secured through an unlawful search and sei
A.

28. Id. at 143.
29. "They conceded that they did not own the automobile and were simply
passengers; the owner of the car had been the driver of the vehicle at the time of the
search." Id. at 130.
30. Id. at 148.
31. 448 U.S. at 93.
32. 439 U.S. at 164-65 (White, J., dissenting).
33. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
34. In that case, defendant's home was broken into by the authorities and sub
jected to a warrantless search. Certain of defendant's personal papers were
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zure resulted in prejudicial error if admitted at trial in federal
court. 35 In 1961 the Court applied the rule to state court proceed
ings: "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of
the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state
court. "36 Before a defendant could exclude illegally obtained evi
dence, he was required to prove that his own fourth amendment
rights had been violated. This obliged a defendant to show some
proprietary or possessory interest in what was searched or seized. 37
If he could demonstrate the requisite interest in both the area
searched and the item seized, almost all courts granted standing. If
a defendant could show either, most courts considered him to have
standing. 38
Prior to Jones, the law was very unsettled about the degree of
interest a defendant needed to gain standing. In determining the
sufficiency of a defendant's interest, the courts applied the "some
times confusing distinctions of the common law on property."39 In
1934, the Ninth Circuit held that an individual had to be the
owner, lessee, or lawful occupant 40 of the searched premises be
fore he could challenge the constitutionality of a search and sei-'
zure. In the Second Circuit, however, a guest or employee who
dwelled on the premises had standing to object to an unlawful
search.41 The Second and Tenth Circuits were in disagreement as
to whether a bailee had the requisite interest to assert standing. 42
The Second Circuit denied standing to an employee whose desk
had been subjected to a search. 43 The United States Court of Ap
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion. 44 Thus, the law concerning standing, at this time, was
unclear.
A possessory interest in the item seized also would be suffi
unlawfully confiscated and admitted into evidence against him at trial on charges of
lottery offenses. Id. at 386-87.
35. Id. at 398.
36. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
37. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 261.
38. Griswold, The Supreme Court 1959 Term, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 152 (1960).
39. Weeks, Standing To Object In The Field of Search & Seizure, 6 ARIZ. L.
REV. 65, 66 (1964).
40. Kwong How v. United States, 71 F.2d 71, 75 (9th Cir. 1934).
41. Daddio v. United States, 125 F.2d 924, 925 (2d Cir. 1942).
42. See In re Number 32 E. 67th St., 96 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1938); Lewis v.
United States, 92 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1937).
43. United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944).
44. United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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cient to achieve standing. 45 As the District of Columbia Circuit
held in United States v. Jeffers, 46 an objection to the admission of
evidence could be made on the basis of ownership of the
unlawfully seized property. This requirement weighed heavily
upon individuals charged with crimes of possession. "At the least,
such a defendant has beeri placed in the criminally tendentious po
sition of explaining his possession of the premises. "47 These sus
pects were pinioned on the horns of a dilemma and, in the words
of Judge Learned Hand, could choose only between horns. 48 Indi
viduals could assert a violation of their fourth amendment rights
only at the risk of self-incrimination. The courts were wont to read
this as an involuntary waiver of fifth amendment protections. Hav
ing voluntarily testified at a suppression hearing, a defendant could
not object to use of his statements at trial. 49
In Jones, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this di
lemma. The Court granted automatic standing in instances where
the indictment itself charged possession since there "the defendant
in a very real sense [was] revealed as a 'person aggrieved by an un
lawful search and seizure.' "50 The Court intended to achieve two
results by creating automatic standing: To remove the self
incrimination dilemma;51 and to prevent the prosecution from
charging a defendant with possession yet asserting that he lacked
enough of a possessory interest to have standing. 52 Out of concern
for the plight of such defendants, the Court waived the require
ment for a showing of actual standing. 53
To resolve much of the confusion surrounding actual standing,
45. See Jeffers v. United States, 187 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afl'd, 342 U.S.
48 (1951); Occinto v. United States, 54 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1931); Belcher v. United
States, 50 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1931); Klein v. United States, 14 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1926).
46. 187 F.2d 498, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1950), af!' d, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
47. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 262.
48. In Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932), Judge Hand wrote:
Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners, or in possession, of
contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a posses
sor, and avoid the perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they
come as victims, they must take on that role with enough detail to cast them
without question. The petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament; but
they were obliged to choose one hom of the dilemma.
Id. at 630.
49. Heller v. United States, 57 F.2d 627, 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S.
567 (1932).
50. 362 U.S. at 264.
51. Id. at 262.
52. Id at 263.
53. Id.
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the Jones Court disregarded the property law concepts establishing
an interest in the premises searched and created a new standard:
"anyone legitimately on the premises"54 during a search could chal
lenge the search's legality through a motion to suppress. Thus,
Jones held that defendants charged with possessory offenses had
automatic standing to challenge the lawfulness of a search and sei
zure. In addition, defendants charged with any crime had a suffi
cient interest in the searched premises to attain actual standing if
legitimately present during a search. Jones, a guest in a friend's
apartment, was found by the Court to have been legitimately on
the premises. 55
This was a far more expansive reading of standing than that es
tablished by earlier cases that required a showing of ownership or
lessee status. 56 Thus, Jones was allowed standing on two grounds:
he had automatic standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
search and seizure because he was charged with a possessory of
fense; and he had actual standing to object to the actions of the au
thorities because he was present during the search. 57 Jones dis
played a sufficient interest in both the premises searched and the
property seized. When a defendant's case fell outside Jones' param
eters, however, the defendant was not protected.
B.

Standing After Jones

Defendants charged with nonpossessory offenses who were not
legitimately on the premises at the time of the unlawful search still
were compelled to balance their fourth and fifth amendment rights
in determining whether to seek actual standing. Those who took
the stand at the suppression hearing often found their testimony
used against them at trial. 58 The Court believed that Jones had not
gone far enough in protecting individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures and; in 1968, handed down the Simrrwns de
cision: a defendant's testimony in support of a motion to suppress
was held inadmissible at trial on the issue of guilt. 59 Simrrwns was
54.

[d. at 267.
55. [d. at 263.
56. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text.
57. 362 U.S. at 263.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Airdo, 380 F.2d 103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 913 (1967). Monroe V. Upited States, 320 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 991 (1964).
59. 390 U.S. at 394. The three defendants, Andrews, Simmons, and Garrett,
were charged with robbing a federally insured savings and loan association. Garrett
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influenced by Katz v. United States,60 which completely rejected
the old property law view of standing. 61 A personal privacy inter
est, not one of property ownership, was substituted. "For the
Fourth Amendment protects peopl~, not places[;] . . . '[t]he prem
ise that property interests control the right of a Government to
search and seize has been discredited.' "62 The principles estab
lished in Jones thus expanded and the concept of standing wid
ened. A "personal privacy interest" was all that had to be shown to
attain actual standing. 63 Any evidence proffered in support of this
interest was inadmissible on the issue of guilt at trial.
.
This trend, however, slowed by 1969. In that year, the Su
preme Court decided Alderman v. United States. 64 In that case,
three defendants were charged with transmitting murderous
threats through interstate commerce. Defendant Alderisio's place
of business had been placed under electronic surveillance by the
authorities. 65 Defendants contended that the tapped conversations
had been overheard illegally and that their content was inadmissi
ble against all three suspects. 66 The Court rejected that argument,
declaring that Alderisio alone had standing. The other defendants
had not participated in any conversations on the premises, nor did
they own the building. 67
Justice Fortas, in his dissent, argued that standing under Jones
extended to all those individuals who were targets of a search. 68 As
support he quoted Jones' language: "[i]n order to qualifY as a 'per
son aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure' one must have

testified at a suppression hearing that the suitcase found on the premises of An
drews' mother was similar to one he owned. He declared that its content belonged to
him. His testimony was admitted into evidence at trial. [d. at 380-81.
.
60. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
61. The property law concepts are discussed in text accompanying notes 39-44
supra.

62. 389 U.S. at 351. Defendant in that case was charged with transmitting wa
gering information interstate. His conversations, made in a public telephone booth,
had been tapped by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [d. at 348.
63. [d. at 351.
64. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
65. [d.
66. [d. at.171.
67. [d. at 176. It is interesting to note that two years earlier, in the Katz deci
sion, the Court rejected the focus on "area" in favor of "personal privacy." 389 U.S.
at 350. In Alderman, the Court once again returned to a discussion of property inter
ests. 394 U.S. at 176.
68. [d. at 205-06 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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been
one against whom the search was directed
."69 He
would have conferred standing upon all three defendants.
The majority did not read Jones so literally. As a result, the
owner of premises under electronic surveillance was given actual
standing to assert a violation of his fourth amendment rights, even
if he made no statements. 70 In other words, a property owner was
granted standing to suppress another person's conversations as well
as his own. An individual who did not own the premises but who
was the target of an investigation involving illegal wiretapping,
however, could not obtain actual standing unless he made state
ments on the premises.
The expectation of privacy established in Katz was narrowed
somewhat. Allowing an owner of the premises to suppress someone
else's private conversations merely because they were held on his
property signaled a retreat to the old ownership confines found so
unwieldy in the past. As Justice Harlan wrote in his dissent in Al
dennan, "the right to the privacy of one's conversation does not
hinge on whether the Government has committed a technical tres
pass upon the premises on which the conversations took place."71
Attainment of actual standing once more required a showing of
ownership.
.
Automatic standing, too, was eviscerated. Brown v. United
States 72 heralded its demise, saying that Jones was no longer nec
essary. Defendants in Brown sought to suppress evidence seized
from an unlawful search of a store belonging to a coconspirator. 73
Because possession was a material element of the offense with
which they were charged, they contended that they had automatic
standing to object to the actions of the authorities. 74 The Court
denied them standing, limiting Jones to situations where "posses
69. [d. at 207 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 261).
70. 394 U.S. at 191 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71. [d. at 190-91.
72. 411 U.S. 223 (1973). The three defendants in that case were charged with
transporting stolen goods and with conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate
commerce. Defendants Brown and Smith stored the stolen items in a warehouse be
longing to defendant Knuckles. [d. at 224-25. All three suspects moved to suppress
the evidence on the ground that the warrant authorizing the search was defective.
The motion to suppress was allowed only for defendant Knuckles. Brown and Smith
failed to allege any proprietary interest in the premises searched or the goods seized.
[d. at 225-26.
73. [d. at 228.
74. [d. at 227.
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sion at the time of the contested search and seizure is 'an essential
element of the offense . . . charged.' "75 The question whether to
overrule Jones was reserved for a later date. 76 The Court viewed
the self-incrimination factor as no longer present:
[t]he self-incrimination dilemma, so central to the Jones deci
sion, can no longer occur under the prevailing interpretation of
the Constitution. Subsequent to Jones, in Simmons v. United
States, ... we held that a prosecutor may not use against a de
fendant at trial any testimony given by that defendant at a
pretrial hearing to establish standing to move to suppress evi
dence. 77

Yet such statements still are available to the prosecution for pur
poses of impeachment. 78 The Court began to challenge the princi
ple upon which automatic standing was established.
Actual standing was further narrowed in Rakas, decided in
1978. 79 Defendants, passengers in an automobile, declared that
they had actual standing to object to the search of the car since
they were legitimately on the premises. 8o The Supreme Court de
clared that the legitimately "on the premises" ground for actual
standing was too broad, further challenging Jones' viability.81 In
stead, actual standing existed only when one had "a legitimate ex
pectation of privacy in the invaded place. "82 The Rakas majority
then attempted to reconcile its position with Jones by asserting that
defendant in that instance, who was a guest in another's apartment,
actually had an expectation of privacy. 83
Justice White, in a lengthy dissent, declared that the Court
once again had relegated standing to property law definitions. 84 In
deed, one of the factors that the Rakas majority pointed to in ex
plaining that Jones had a legitimate expectation of privacy was that
he had a key to the apartment. 85 The passengers in Rakas, who
were denied standing, had no such control over the vehicle in
75.
added).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

[d. at 228 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 390) (emphasis
[d.
[d.
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 96 (Marshall,
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 128.
Id at 132.
Id. at 143.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 156-57 (White, J., dissenting).
[d. at 164-65.

J., dissenting).
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which they were riding. According to Justice White, nothing short
of ownership of the automobile would have satisfied the majority's
expectation of privacy test. 86
Mter Rakas, actual standing was so constricted that there were
only three ways to attain it: To own the area searched; to control
access to that area, as Jones could through possession of a key to
the searched apartment; or to claim ownership of the seized evi
dence. 87 Legitimate presence on the property of another, absent
some control, proved unavailing.
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 88 decided the same day as Salvucci,
further limited actual standing by making Rakas' requisite expecta
tion of privacy difficult to establish. In Rawlings, defendant was
present at the unlawful search of another's home. His companion's
purse was searched. At her request, he claimed ownership of illicit
drugs that were in the purse. Charges of possession were brought
against him, and he attempted to suppress the evidence. 89
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the majority. He as
serted that defendant bore the burden of proving both that the
search of the woman's purse was illegal and that he had a legiti
mate expectation of privacy in the purse. 90 Justice Rehnquist con
trasted the Rawlings situation with the one in Jones. Rawlings had.
known the owner of the purse for only a few days, had never be
fore used the purse to store items, and could not prevent others
from having access to it. 91 Jones, on the other hand, was a guest in
an apartment, and he had a key.92 When Rakas and Rawlings are
read together, it becomes apparent that the grounds to claim actual
standing have been so narrowly drawn as to require an assertion of
ownership of the area searched.
Rawlings' claim to ownership of the drugs proved to be un
availing. The majority held that, while ownership of the seized
drugs was one fact to consider in deciding the issue of standing,
Rakas had rejected adherence to property law concepts in
determining fourth amendment interests. 93 Therefore, a privacy in
86. Id.
87. Comment, Constitutional Law-Searches & Seizures-Standing & Fourth
Amendment Rights, 46 TENN. L. REV. 827, 845 (1979).
88. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
89. Id. at 101.
90. Id. at 104.
91. Id. at 105.
92. Although Jones did possess a key to his friend's apartment, he had spent
only one night there. 362 U.S. at 259.
93. 448 U.S. at 104.
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terest in the searched premises tantamount to ownership is re
quired for actual standing, yet this privacy interest cannot be
shown by ownership of the seized goods. "'[A]rcane' concepts of
property law"94 once again govern the determination of actual
standing.
In Salvucci, the Court turned to the concept of automatic
standing. Justice Rehnquist wrote that the self-incrimination di
lemma that prompted the Jones decision had been obviated by
Simrrwns. Since any testimony offered in support of a suppression
motion was inadmissible at trial on the issue ofguilt, Si1?1mons pro
tected defendants charged with both possessory and nonpossessory
offenses. 95 The first basis for automatic standing was held no longer
to exist.
Another anomaly considered by the Court in Jones was the
self-contradiction allowed the prosecution in denying standing to an
individual charged with a possessory offense. 96 Justice Rehnquist,
in Salvucci, easily dismissed this by stating: "[d]evelopments in the
principles of Fourth Amendment standing, as well, clarify that a
prosecutor may, with legal consistency and legitimacy, assert that a
defendant charged with possession of a seized item did not have a
privacy interest violated in the course of the search and seizure. "97
These "developments" were the narrowing of fourth amend
ment privacy interests solely to the premises searched, not to the
items seized. Justice Rehnquist dismissed the Jones Court's as
sumption that possession of a seized item also was sufficient to at
tain standing. According to Justice Rehnquist, that assumption was
incorrect. 98
After Salvucci, an individual charged with a possessory offense
no longer can assert automatic standing. In order to attain actual
standing, he must allege a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
premises searched. The self-incrimination and self-contradiction
problems have been obviated since a declaration of ownership of
the seized goods is insufficient to confer standing. The dilemma has
been resolved, but at what cost?

94. Id. at 105.
95. 448 U.S. at 90.
96. 362 U.S. at 263.
97. 448 U.S. at 88-89.
98. Id. at 90.
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III. ANALYSIS
Justice Rehnquist, in Salvucci, stated that the exclusionary
rule is but one form of remedy for fourth amendment violations
and, as such, is available only to those whose rights have been vio
lated. It cannot be asserted vicariously by persons who are third
parties to a search. 99 The remedy is to be afforded only to the vic
tims of unreasonable searches and seizures. 100
There are two prevailing schools of thought as to the function
of the exclusionary rule. Some authorities view it as a means of
deterring unlawful police actions. 101 Others perceive it as part and
parcel of the fourth amendment guarantees and thus as an individ
ual right. 102 Those alleging it to be a deterrent measure argue that
its purpose is not to redress the injury to the search victim: that
person's disrupted privacy cannot be restored. Rather, deterrence
of future unlawful police activity is the purpose behind the rule. loa
To Justice Rehnquist, the exclusionary rule is but one of many
methods available to the courts to assure proper police conduct. 104
The deterrence rationale can be used to come to a very differ
ent conclusion than that reached by Justice Rehnquist. Contrary to
Justice Rehnquist's belief, the exclusionary rule can be viewed as
the sole effective deterrent of unlawful police activity. It should,
therefore, be applied broadly. Thus the protections of the exclu
sionary rule need not be limited solely to the victims of unreason
able searches. Third parties, such as defendants in Rakas and
Rawlings, also should be able to reap its benefits. To hold other
wise would allow the authorities to violate one person's privacy in
order to secure evidence against another.

99. Id. at 86.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large In The Fifty States, 1962 DUKE
L.J. 319; Comment, Evidence-Search & Seizure-Standing to Suppress Evidence
Obtained by Unconstitutional Search & Seizure, 55 MICH. L. REV. 567 (1957); Com
ment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search & Seizure, 34 U. CHI. L. REV.
342 (1967); Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search & Seizure, 1965 WASH.
U. L.Q. 488 (1965). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 383.
102. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Safarik v. United States,
62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933); Comment, supra note 87, at 827. See also text accompa
nying notes 107-11 infra.
103. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
104. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
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As Judge Traynor noted in People v. Martin,105 "if law en
forcement officers are allowed to evade the exclusionary rule by
obtaining evidence in violation of the rights of third parties, its de
terrent effect is to that extent nullified. "106 California, pursuant to
its state constitution, goes so far as to disallow the admitting into
evidence of the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure without
requiring a showing of standing. 107
The Supreme Court, which has a more restricted view of the
exclusionary rule, considers it to be a mere deterrence measure. 108
The Court has drawn the confines of standing so narrowly as to ap
ply solely to persons with an ownership interest in the area
searched. To view the rule as a deterrence measure yet to give
such a small number of people standing to suppress illegally ob
tained evidence amounts to a contradiction.
Third Parties and the Exclusionary Rule
McDonald v. United States 109 was decided in 1948. In that
case, the Court determined that the fruits of an unlawful search
were inadmissible against both the individual who rented the
premises and his codefendant. uo Later cases have rejected such an
application of the exclusionary rule.1l1 No longer can an individual
challenge the admissibility of incriminating evidence absent a
showing of standing. He must demonstrate a violation of his own
privacy before the exclusionary rule can be invoked. u2 Thus, the
police can circumvent fourth amendment proscriptions by con
ducting searches against one individual in the hope of securing evi
dence against his coconspirators. Defendants in Rakas' were indeed
the targets of an unlawful search. They were passengers in a motor
vehicle matching the description of a robbery getaway car. Their
A.

105. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
106. [d. at 760, 290 P.2d at 857.
107. Id.
108. "In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a per
sonal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974).
109. 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
110. Id. at 456.
Ill. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. at 223; Alderma.n v. United States,
394 U.S. at 165; United States v. Dye, 508 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
974 (1974); United Stales v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1048 (1974).
112. United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236, 240 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1048 (1974).
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female companions were not suspects to the crime.113 Rakas,
though, ruled that actual standing is no longer available to individ
uals legitimately on the premises. u4 Standing is available only to
those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy tantamount to
ownership of the premises. The search of the motor vehicle in
Rakas, arguably unlawful, could not be contested by defendants. us
Rakas emasculated the exclusionary rule: illegal police activity was
encouraged, not deterred. U6
The results reached by those who view the exclusionary rule
as an individual right guaranteed by the fourth amendment are
equally inconsistent. Even though these theorists view the right as
personal to the one asserting it, they still require a showing of a
proprietary or possessory interest in what was searched or seized
before the exclusionary rule can be invoked. U7 The case law indi
cates that an assertion of ownership of the searched premises is
necessary to demonstrate an interest sufficient to attain standing. u8
The Supreme Court, therefore, has allowed the fourth amendment
to apply to a very small number of individuals. If the exclusionary
rule were included within the amendment as a personal safeguard,
then many victims of unreasonable searches and seizures would be
rightless as well as remediless since the protections against unlaw
ful police activity apply only to the propertied. 119
H, however, the fourth amendment were to be viewed as a so
cietal right' to privacy, the exclusionary rule could fulfill its deter
rence objectives. "[I]f the exclusionary rule follows from the
Fourth Amendment itself, there is no basis for confining its invoca
tion to persons whose right of privacy has been violated by an ille
gal search. "120 Indeed, some commentators have read two rights
into its language: A personal right to be free from unreasonable
113.

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 130.

114. ld. at 142.
115. ld. at 148.
116. Compare Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith & Hope,
42 NEB. L. REV. 483, 539 (1963); Comment, supra note 101, at 357; Coinment,
Search & Seizure: Admissibility of Illegally Acquired Evidence Against Third Par
ties, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 400,404 (1966).
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954).
See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 119; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at
156 (White, J., dissenting).
119. "Without a showing of an interest in the property or the right to control it,
they have no standing to suppress the evidence taken from the truck." United States
v. Dye, 508 F.2d 1226, 1233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1974).
120. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 205 (Fortas, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part).
117.

118.
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searches; and a general right of the citizenry to be free from
tainted evidence corrupting the functions of the courts. 121
Eliminating the need for proof of a personal privacy interest would
further society's objective of excluding the fruits of unlawful
searches from admission into evidence. Frequently, under the per
sonal privacy test, no one has the requisite interest to object.
Whether the exclusionary rule is construed as a deterrence
tool or as one element of the fourth amendment, it must be ap
plied broadly to achieve its purpose. As Justice Douglas pointed
out in his dissent in Irvine v. California,122 "Exclusion of evidence
is indeed the only effective sanction [to unlawful police
searches. ]"123 Contrary to Justice Rehnquist's contention,124 it is
not merely one method of many to be called upon to curtail police
abuses. The narrow reading of standing evinced by Rawlings and
Salvucci makes achievement of the deterrence objective impossi
ble. The true targets of unlawful police activity are barred from
.
"vicariously assert[ing]"125 fourth amendment violations.
B.

Standing After Salvucci

In Salvucci, Justice Rehnquist asserted that automatic standing
amounted to a "windfal1"126 to criminal defendants. In United
States v. Di RE, 127 however, the Court held:
[w}e have had frequent occasion to point out that a search is not
to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad
when it starts and does not change character from its success.
. . . But the forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history,
designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too
permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was
a greater danger to a free people than the escape of some crimi
nals from punishment. 128

Balancing deterrence objectives against the possibility that
some guilty individuals may go free leads to the absurdity of using
a cost-benefit analysis to decide whether a constitutional right is

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Comment, supra note 101, at 365.
347 U.S. 128 (1954).
Id. at 151 (emphasis added) (Douglas,
448 U.S. at 86.
Id.
[d. at 95.
332 U.S. 581 (1948).
Id. at 595.

J.,

dissenting).

\
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applicable. 129 Granting the protections of the fourth amendment
only to those with a property interest in the searched premises
permits unlawful searches to be directed against third parties.
Hence, the victims of unlawful police activity in many instances are
barred from asserting a constitutional violation. The courts then be
come participants in a grave injustice to society.
The Rakas opinion, which established the expectation of pri
vacy test, was written by Justice Rehnquist. 13o He pointed out that
defendants "asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in
the automobile, nor an interest in the property seized. "131 In ap
plying the Rakas rationale to Salvucci, he disregarded the second
prong of traditional fourth amendment standing analysis. Possession
of a seized good was no longer Justice Rehnquist's focus; rather, he
emphasized a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
searched. 132 Possession was held to create" 'too broad a gauge for
measurement of Fourth Amendment rights.' "133
If the Salvucci Court has eliminated the second prong of the
standing test, which it appeared to do despite its dearth of explana
tion, it is contrary to a lengthy history of case law. 134 Further, re
jecting possession as a ground for standing eliminates the self
incrimination dilemma but creates a more serious problem. If
possession of the seized good is insufficient to confer standing, de
fendants will not have to take the stand to make such a claim. Nor
will the police tactics used to obtain the evidence come under judi
cial scrutiny. The deterrence rationale behind the exclusionary rule
is not satisfied by such a narrow definition of standing.
If, however, a defendant takes the stand in an effort to assert
the requisite interest in the area searched, Simmons does not pro
vide complete protection from the self-incrimination threat. Al
though pretrial testimony cannot be admitted on the issue of guilt,
129. See, e.g., White & Greenspan, Standing To Object Search And Seizure,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1970).
130. 439 U.S. at 128.
131. ld. at 148 (emphasis added).
132. 448 U.S. at 92.
133. Id. at 92-93.
134. See Jeffers v. United States, 187 F.2d at 498; Gibson v. United States, 149
F.2d 381 (D.C. CiL), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 724 (1945).
See also 448 U.S. at 90-91 n.5, where Justice Rehnquist attempted to condition
the Jeffers holding on both an interest in the premises searched and the property
seized. On the contrary, the Jeffers case stands for the proposition that an interest in
the property seized alone is sufficient to confer standing. United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. at 54. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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it can be used for impeachment purposes. 135 Justice Marshall, in
his dissent to the Salvucci decision, declared: "[t]he use of the tes
timony for impeachment purposes would subject a defendant to
precisely the same dilemma, unless he was prepared to relinquish
his constitutional right to testify in his own defense, and would
thereby create a strong deterrent to asserting Fourth Amendment
claims. "136
The Supreme Court earlier had hinted that the use of testi
mony for impeachment purposes is violative of the fifth amend
ment. 137 In Miranda v. Arizona,138 the Court held that use of a
defendant's own statements for purposes of impeachment rendered
his words self-incriminating. 139 The Jones dilemma still exists.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In United States v. Salvucci,140 the Supreme Court overruled
Jones v. United States,141 which allowed defendants charged with
possessory offenses to automatically challenge an unlawful search
and seizure. Automatic standing, therefore, is no longer available
to defendants charged with crimes of possession. To challenge the
constitutionality of a search and seizure, all individuals, even those
charged with possessory offenses, must now meet the requirements
of actual standing.
The confines of actual standing have been severely restricted
by Salvucci and Rawlings. Defendants now must allege an intru
sion upon a legitimate expectation of privacy in order to have
standing to suppress evidence secured through a fourth amend
ment violation. This privacy interest must be in the area searched;
demonstration of an interest in the property seized will prove una
vailing. Requiring a demonstration of a legitimate expectation of

135. See Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, 34
U. CHI. L. REV. 939 (1967). Using testimony for impeachment purposes "undermines
the policy of deterring unlawful police action. Although the prosecution could not
use unlawfully obtained evidence in its case in chief such evidence would still be
useful to it." Id. at 943. Thus, evidence suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search
and seizure is not completely barred from use by the prosecution. Its effect as an im
peachment tool can be just as damaging to a defendant as if it were admitted on the
issue of guilt.
136. 448 U.S. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
137. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 477.
140. 448 U.S. at 85.
141. 362 U.S. at 263.
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privacy in the area searched confers standing only upon those with
an ownership interest in the seatched premises. Defendants who
cannot make this showing cannot invoke the exclusionary rule to
bar the fruits of unlawful police activity from admission into evi
dence.
In the two cases before the Supreme Court in 1980, defend
ants were left remediless despite apparently improper police ac
tion. In Salvucci, the lower courts found the search unreasonable
since the warrant lacked probable cause. 142 In Rawlings, the ques
tion of an illegal detention was never answered due to the Court's
focus upon defendant's standing. 143 Police activity was suspect in
both instances, yet the courts were precluded from resolving the
issue of unreasonableness because defendants were denied standing
to object. The fruits of possible unlawful police tactics thus were
admitted into evidence. The deterrence objective of the exclusion
ary rule was not met.
Restricting actual standing derogates the fourth amendment to
a status far below that established by the framers of the Constitu
tion. Fourth amendment protections can only be invoked by th~
propertied few.
The exclusionary rule is much more than a mere hindrance to
the admission of relevant evidence. It is the sole effective check
available to the citizenry against police abuses. In the words of the
Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio,144 "The criminal goes free, if he
must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard for the charter of its own existence. "145
Katherine E. McMahon
142.
143.
144.
145.

599 F.2d at 1096.
448 U.S. at 106.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
[d. at 659.

